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Abstract
We examine the bilateral composition of international bond portfolios for the euro area and
the individual EMU member countries. We find considerable support for “euro area bias”:
EMU member countries disproportionately invest in one another relative to other country pairs.
Another striking pattern is the positive connection between trade linkages and financial linkages
in explaining asymmetries across EMU member countries in terms of their outward and inward
bond investments vis-a-vis external counterparties. At the aggregate level, it is those countries
physically closest to the euro area that are both the most important destinations and sources
for external bond investment vis-a-vis the euro area. Our empirical results support the notion
that financial regionalization is the leading force underlying financial globalization.
1 Introduction
Financial globalization is a key force that is reshaping the nature of the linkages across the major
economic zones in the world economy. One dimension of globalization is the rising share of financial
assets and liabilities held by foreign investors.1 However, it is by no means the case that the pattern
of foreign ownership is uniformly globalized in the sense that the national identity of investors has
ceased to matter. Rather, the “international investor base” significantly diﬀers across countries and
regions, reflecting variation in both aggregate economic fundamentals (i.e. some countries are more
attractive than others to all investors) and also bilateral linkages (i.e. the demand by an investor in
region i for the financial assets issued by region j may be influenced by bilateral economic variables
and also common institutional and cultural ties).
Such heterogeneity in the investor base potentially matters for two reasons. First, the cost of
capital and the stability of international demand for the assets issued by a given country or region
will depend on the characteristics of its international investor base. Second, the bilateral pattern
of investment holdings will in itself influence the transmission of financial shocks, the nature of
international risk-sharing and also potentially aﬀect exchange rate regime choices.2
In this paper, we investigate these issues by analyzing the bilateral patterns in international
bond holdings, with a particular emphasis on European Monetary Union (EMU). We ask various
questions about EMU. Do EMUmembers disproportionately invest in other EMUmember countries,
relative to other destinations? With respect to external financial linkages, is there systematic
heterogeneity in the external bond portfolios (assets and liabilities) of the individual EMU member
countries? By addressing such questions, the contribution of the paper is to build a profile of the
role of the euro in shaping global bond portfolios.
At an empirical level, we address these questions by exploiting the recent release of the IMF’s
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) that reports the portfolio holdings of 67 investor
countries in 220 destination territories. The availability of the CPIS dataset represents a considerable
advance relative to previous studies that relied on smaller samples and used data on transactions
rather than holdings (see, for example, Portes et al 2001).
In terms of focus, we place a special emphasis on investigating the connections between bilateral
1See, for instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003).
2On the latter, see Devereux and Lane (2003) for some suggestive evidence.
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financial holdings and various bilateral ties, such as bilateral trade, physical proximity, bilateral
macroeconomic correlations and bilateral cultural and institutional similarities. This is in line
with recent theoretical contributions that emphasize the importance of such bilateral factors in
determining portfolio allocations in a world still characterised by pervasive frictions in both product
and financial markets.
This work builds on a number of recent contributions. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) develop
a general empirical modelling approach for the study of bilateral investment positions, with an
application to the international equity holdings for a large sample of investor nations. In related
work, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) investigate the international equity holdings of euro area
investors. In terms of the empirical analysis of bond portfolios, Portes et al (2001) study the
geography of gross bond flows between the US and forty partner countries, while Burger and
Warnock (2004) analyse the international bond holdings of US investors. Another related contribution
is the analysis of bank asset portfolios by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005). Finally, Anderton et al
(2004), Baele et al (2004), Geis et al (2004) and Pagano and Von Thadden (2004) each provide useful
surveys of recent developments in European financial markets and the growth in euro-denominated
securities issued by international participants in global capital markets.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. We briefly discuss the relevant theoretical
issues in thinking about the geography of bond portfolios in section 2. Section 3 introduces the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) that is the source of the data on international
bond holdings and, taking a euro area perspective, describes some broad patterns in the data. A
range of empirical questions concerning EMU and the importance of the euro area in international
bond holdings are addressed in the econometric analysis in section 4. Finally, directions for future
research and some concluding remarks are oﬀered in section 6.
2 A Conceptual Framework
In a benchmark finance model (e.g. the ICAPM), investors should hold the bonds of each issuer
in proportion to its share of global bond market capitalisation.3 This is the case to the extent
3See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for a more formal treatment and detailed literature review of international
asset allocation, with an application to international investment patterns in equity markets. See also the discussion
in Burger and Warnock (2004).
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that there are no real or financial imperfections that distort international trade in goods or assets,
such that the optimal allocation rule is independent of the nationality of the investor. However,
the segmentation of product and capital markets, plus informational asymmetries and diﬀerences
in institutions (such as tax and legal systems) across countries mean that the world is far distant
from this benchmark. The presence of such frictions means that the optimal portfolio allocation
strategy plausibly varies with the nationality of the investor.
The incompleteness of financial markets also means that international diversification strategies
may vary across countries. In a multi-currency world, hedging against nominal currency risk is
costly, such there may be a preference for bonds issued in the investor’s home currency.4 In addition,
to the extent that a group of countries share a common financial infrastructure, this should raise
intra-group financial trade relative to other destinations that may involve higher transactions costs
(Martin and Rey 2000). These two factors are especially relevant for the euro area, to the extent that
the single currency has both eliminated nominal exchange rate risk among the member countries
and lowered transactions costs by improving liquidity through a deepening and broadening of the
consolidated euro area bond market, relative to the individual national bond markets that operated
prior to the launch of EMU.
In terms of other factors„ much recent research has emphasized that information sets vary
greatly across investors. This is a popular rationalisation of home bias in portfolios: the multi-
country version of this argument is that bilateral investment patterns should correlate with the
strength of informational linkages between diﬀerent country pairs. Again, it may be argued that
the single currency has substantially integrated the financial market of the euro area and thereby
improved the information flow among member countries.5
An additional consideration is that investors in diﬀerent countries face diﬀerent “endowment”
risks (e.g. non-diversifiable shocks to labour income or tax rates): the basket of international
4Our data do not permit us to distinguish between the nationality and currency denomination of a bond issue.
However, Burger and Warnock (2004) report that local-currency bonds represent 93 percent of total bonds outstanding
for developed-country markets and 78 percent of total bonds outstanding for emerging markets. For advanced-country
destinations, there is likely to be a strong overlap between the nationality of the issuer and the currency of issue; for
developing-country destinations, in contrast, external investors primarily hold the foreign-currency bonds issued by
these countries.
5See also Baele (2004) for a recent review of the integration of the European financial markets. Pagano and von
Thadden (2004) provide an extensive study of recent developments in the euro area bond market.
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assets that oﬀers the best hedge against these risks may vary on a bilateral basis.6 In addition,
with regard to the segmentation of product markets, there are several reasons to believe that trading
partners should receive a higher weight in portfolios. A basic reason is that the volume of trade is
a good predictor of the level of bilateral exchange rate volatility (Devereux and Lane 2003, Broda
and Romalis 2003). As such, currency risk is minimised by preferring the bonds of major trading
partners.
Along another dimension, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) show that the incentive to hold state-
contingent foreign assets is increased, the more investors are exposed to consumption risk through
fluctuations in the supply of imported goods. At the extreme, a country that just purchases
domestic goods is not exposed to external shocks to its level of its consumption and so need not be
concerned with hedging against this risk. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) generalize this argument
to an N-country setting, with the prediction that bilateral portfolio shares should be positively
related to import shares in order to minimize consumption risk.Although the focus of these authors
was on international equity portfolios, analagous reasoning may apply to bond allocations. For
instance, holding the domestic-currency bonds issued by a trading partner provides a natural hedge
against bilateral real exchange rate movements: if the relative price of the import good rises, this
is oﬀset by the increased real return for the domestic investor from holding the foreign bond.7
We build our empirical specifications in the econometric work in section 4 on the basis of these
theoretical arguments that provide some hypotheses as to why the composition of international
bond portfolios may deviate on a country-by-country basis.
3 The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
In this section, we first discuss some features of the CPIS, before presenting an overview of the
broad patterns in the data on international bond portfolios, with a primary focus on the euro area
as a source and destination for cross-border bond investments.
6See Davis et al (2001) for a formal treatment of this point.
7Whether the hedged return on a foreign bond positively or negatively comoves with the real exchange rate (or
the terms of trade) is ambiguous: in general, it depends on the source of the relative price shock and the relative
importance of nominal risk versus credit risk in determining the value of the foreign bond. See also a related example
in Obstfeld (2004).
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3.1 Data Issues
The source of data on bond holdings is the CPIS, which is organised by the International Monetary
Fund. After a smaller survey in 1997, the 2001 survey included 67 source countries and 218
destination territories.8 Estimated holdings for 2002 have also been released: however, these data
do not reflect benchmark surveys by all participants and rely to some extent on extrapolations
from the 2001 survey. For this reason, we mainly focus on the 2001 cross-section in this study.9
However, we do also examine the changes in bond portfolios between 1997 and 2001 in seeking to
establish the impact of EMU.
While the CPIS represents a major advance in availability of data on bilateral investment
positions, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) point out that the survey is imperfect. First,
holdings are surely under-reported by some countries due to incomplete coverage or the complexities
of tax-driven asset management structures.10 Second, the bilateral data can be distorted by
third-party holdings to the extent that final ownership of assets is not properly traced: this is
a larger problem for those countries that primarily surveyed custodians rather than end investors.
Third, in relation to debt securities, the survey oﬀers relatively little information on the currency
denomination of bonds.11 Finally, the CPIS does not report the domestic holdings of investors,
such that it does not provide a complete profile of the composition of portfolios but rather only
details the geographical breakdown of the cross-border component of investment positions.
It is also important to understand that the CPIS reports only aggregate holdings: it does not
provide the decomposition in terms of whether securities are issued (or held) by public or private
institutions and or the relative holdings of individual investors versus financial intermediaries.
Moreover, it does not give details as to the “age profile” of the holdings in terms of whether
particular assets were recently acquired or have been held for a long time. For these reasons, the
CPIS, while useful, by no means provides a complete profile of the investor base in international
8The 1997 survey did not include some important investor nations (e.g. Germany) as a source country, severely
limiting its usefulness in examining the investment patterns of the aggregate euro area. However, in the next section,
we will compare changes in investment patterns between 1997 and 2001 in order to assess whether EMU membership
has influenced portfolio allocations.
9At any rate, the correlation between the 2001 and 2002 holdings is extremely high.
10For instance, the German survey did not cover holdings by households.
11See the analysis in Geis et al (2004). Even for those countries that do report the breakdown across the major
currencies, these data are provided only in the aggregate, rather than on a destination-by-destination basis.
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bond markets.
3.2 Broad Patterns
We begin in Figure 1 by looking at the total international bond holdings of EMUmember countries.12
The euro area aggregate amounts to $2.36 trillion in cross-border assets, or 38.5 percent of GDP.
Of these, 62.2 percent of the international holdings are invested in other member countries, with
extra-EMU bond holdings representing $890 billion or 14.5 percent of GDP. Of the individual
countries, Figure 1 does not include Luxembourg: its cross-border bond holdings amount to nearly
2100 percent of its GDP, with the distribution between intra- and extra-area destinations similar
to that for the aggregate. Clearly, this extraordinarily large bond portfolio reflects Luxembourg’s
status as a major financial center for European asset management and also highlights that a major
proportion of these holdings have not been traced back to the end investor. Albeit to a lesser
extent, Ireland also shows up as a major financial center, with a bond portfolio valued at 182.2
percent of its GDP.13 At the other end of the distribution, Greece has by far the lowest ratio of
international bond assets to GDP at 5.1 percent, with most of the other countries in the 20-40
percent range. Another noteworthy feature is that only Greece and Ireland devote more than 50
percent of their portfolios to territories outside the euro area, with the other countries exhibiting
much higher levels of ‘euro area’ bias in the allocation of their international bond holdings.
In terms of external destinations, the US and UK are by far the two most popular individual
destinations although there is considerable heterogeneity across the member countries. With respect
to external bond liabilities, Japan is the single biggest bond investor in the euro area, responsible for
about one-third of total external holdings, with the UK a close second and the US and Switzerland
also each contributing more than 10 percent of total inward investment into the euro area.14. In
the next section, we attempt to tease out some of the determinants of these various patterns in the
relations between the euro area and global bond markets.
12Throughout the paper, we focus on the data for long-term debt securities. The CPIS does provide some
information on short-term debt securities but there are many more missing observations for this category.
13 Ireland set up an International Financial Services Center (IFSC) in 1987, which has attracted many international
firms to establish both back-end and front-end asset management operations there.
14See Lane (2005) for more description of the basic stylized facts about the geographical composition of bond
portfolios.
6
4 EMU and Cross-Border Bond Portfolios
We begin this section by analysing whether a “euro area bias” is evident in the data. Subsequently,
we investigate the external bond holdings of the euro area, in order to establish the determinants
of the euro area’s aggregate external bond holdings (both assets and liabilities) and whether there
are systematic diﬀerences in the external portfolios of the individual EMU member countries.
4.1 Do EMU Member Countries Invest Disproportionately in Each Other?
Do EMU member countries invest disproportionately in each other? To address this question,
we consider a sample of source countries that includes 11 EMU member countries and 11 other
high-income countries from outside the euro area, to form a sample of 22 source countries.15
By contrasting the behavior of members and similar non-members, we can investigate whether
a country pair where both are members of the euro area has a diﬀerent investment pattern than
other country pairs.
Our general specification is
log(BONDij) = φi + φj + ρEUROij + γ log(IMPij) + βZij + εij i = {HIGH − INC} (1)
where the dependent variable is the level of source country j’s bond holdings in destination country
i. We include a pair-wise dummy EUROij that takes the value 1 if both the source and destination
countries are members of the euro area and 0 otherwise. To the extent that the various control
variables capture the natural variation in bilateral bond investment patterns, the pairwise EURO
dummy variable will measure the impact of joint membership of the euro area ‘over and above’
the other linkages that tie together the various pairings among EMU member countries. The
inclusion of country dummies for each source and host countries means that we control for all
characteristics that determine a country’s general propensity to invest externally and to be a
recipient of inward investment respectively (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004 for an extended
15These are the US, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Canada, Iceland, Australia and New
Zealand. These countries are advanced economies that are structurally similar to the EMU member countries and as
such form a natural comparator group. Luxembourg is excluded as a source country due to its special status as an
oﬀshore centre.
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discussion of this specification).16 As such, we rather seek to explain portfolio asymmetries: why
does country A disproportionately invest in destination X, whereas country B relatively over-weights
destination Y?
The inclusion of double fixed eﬀects means that our list of regressors is confined to bilateral
variables that vary across country pairs (i, j). In addition to the volume of imports, we consider
in a range of specifications a set of other variables that may proxy for informational linkages, the
scope for diversification and institutional similarities between country pairs. Finally, since there
are a large number of zero or small-value bilateral holdings in the data (in terms of bond holdings
in the smaller developing countries), we restrict attention to positions in excess of $1 million.17
We also provide some time-series evidence on this question by looking at changes in portfolio
allocation between 1997 and 2001. The number of investor countries is reduced, since the 1997
survey covered a smaller number of countries – from this high-income group, two EMU members
(Germany and Greece) and one important non-member (Switzerland) are excluded.18 Table 8 shows
the growth in foreign bond holdings for each member country between 1997 and 2001. In most
cases, the growth in holdings in other member countries far exceeds the growth in the aggregate
portfolio: the diﬀerential is especially striking for Finland, Italy and Spain.
In order to conduct a more formal investigation, we adopt the specification
∆ log(BONDij) = φi+φj+ρEUROij+γ∆ log(IMPij)+β1∆Z1ij+β2Z2ij+εij i = {HIGH−INC}
(2)
where Z1 is a set of regressors that are entered in first diﬀerences and Z2 are entered in levels.19
The empirical results are shown in Table 1: columns (1)-(3) report levels specifications, while
the findings from the diﬀerences specifications are displayed columns (4)-(6) .20 In column (1),
we just include the EURO dummy as the sole bilateral regressor (in addition to the fixed source
16 If we just restricted the set of source countries to the euro area members, a euro dummy could only be included
by dropping the “double fixed eﬀects” specification and employing a panel version of the specification similar to
equation (3) below. It turns out that a euro dummy is highly significant in such a specification. However, since it
is not possible to include source and host country dummies, this alternative approach cannot rule out that omitted
factors correlated with EMU membership is responsible for its significance.
17However, results are very similar if we include these data points.
18These countries are still included as destination countries in the survey.
19We still include the double fixed eﬀects in this specification ... .
20Due to its oﬀshoring role, we exclude Luxembourg from this exercise.
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and host country dummies). The dummy variable is highly significant, both statistically and
economically. This basic specification suggests that the level of cross-border bond investment
between two members of the euro area is 331 percent higher than between any other country pair
in the sample.21
In column (2), we include those bilateral variables that are most plausibly correlated with the
joint membership of the euro area: the volume of bilateral imports; the level of bilateral exchange
rate volatility; and joint membership of the European Union. In addition, we include some popular
gravity-type variables: distance, a colonial dummy, a border dummy and a common language
dummy. We also add the correlation of output growth rates between the source and destination
countries and a tax treaty dummy to the specification. The former is intended to capture the
scope for bilateral risk diversification, to the extent that output growth is a good proxy for bond
returns.22
Despite the inclusion of these controls, the euro dummy remains highly significant: in terms of
magnitude, it now implies a 114 percent ‘euro bonus’ in terms of bilateral bond investment. That
the euro dummy remains significant even with the inclusion of these regressors tells us that the
eﬀect is not simply attributable to the elimination of exchange rate volatility among the member
countries, the high level of intra-EMU trade or common membership of the EU.
In turn, this indicates the explanation for the euro eﬀect lies in the institutional impact of
EMU in terms of the unification of the euro area bond market and the importance of ‘truly zero’
currency risk in determining the composition of bond portfolios. At one level, EMU acts to reduce
transactions costs due to the greater liquidity of the unified market and the elimination of currency
conversion and hedging costs. At another level, EMU has altered the basic properties of the bonds
issued by governments and corporations in the member countries - these now are much closer
substitutes due to the absence of currency risk.
Finally, at the cost of a major reduction in sample size (in eﬀect, the set of destination countries
now comprises only major industrial and middle-income countries), we include a dummy variable
for ‘common legal origin’ in column (3). This variable is intended to capture a basic level of
21 If the fixed eﬀects are excluded, the estimated value for the EURO dummy is 6.26 (t = 34.3) and the adj.R2 =
0.16.
22See Chen (1991) and Ilmanen (1995). Data on bond returns are only available for a fairly-small subset of the
countries in our sample.
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institutional similarity between the source and destination countries and has been found to have
some explanatory power for bilateral patterns in equity investments (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
2004). Although the estimated coeﬃcient for the EURO dummy does fall in value in column (3),
it still indicates that cross-border bond investment is 99 percent larger among euro area member
countries than between other country pairs.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, the level of imports and distance are highly
significant in both columns (2) and (3). As was discussed in section 2, there are multiple hypotheses
as to why portfolio holdings are skewed towards trading partners and geographically-proximate
destinations. Regarding the role of trade, this may reflect an optimal risk diversification strategy;
alternatively, trade in goods may also be a good information vehicle. Regarding distance, this also
has a information interpretation but may also proxy for institutional similarity or lower transactions
costs. Further research is required to discriminate between these various hypotheses.
The other individually-significant regressors are colonial relationship (positive) and common
language (positive) - each of these variables have the expected sign. In addition, the common legal
origin variable is highly significant in column (3), indicating that institutional similarity may be
important in determining bilateral holdings. The border variable is now also significant, albeit
with a negative sign. However, the colonial and common language dummies are not individually
significant in this smaller sample, perhaps suggesting that these variables are more relevant in
explaining allocations across less-advanced economies that are not included in this smaller sample.
We turn to the time-series evidence in columns (4)-(6), by looking at changes in portfolio
allocation between 1997 and 2001. The number of investor countries is reduced, since the 1997
survey covered a smaller number of countries – from this high-income group, two EMU members
(Germany and Greece) and one important non-member (Switzerland) are excluded.23 Table 2 shows
the growth in foreign bond holdings for each member country between 1997 and 2001. In most
cases, the growth in holdings in other member countries far exceeds the growth in the aggregate
portfolio: the diﬀerential is especially striking for Finland, Italy and Spain.
We see in the basic specification that is reported in column (4) of Table 1 that bond holdings
indeed grew significantly more quickly between members of the euro area than between other
country pairs: the estimated coeﬃcient indicates intra-EMU bilateral holdings grew by an additional
23These countries are still included as destination countries in the survey.
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129 percent. It turns out that the inclusion of the other regressors in columns (5)-(6) only slightly
reduces the estimtated coeﬃcient, with the estimated magnitude in the range of [86, 125] percent.
With regard to the control variables, the growth in imports between 1997 and 2001 is significantly
positive only in the smaller sample in column (6). The only other significant results are that a
common border reduces holdings in column (5) and countries that share a common legal origin
experienced faster growth in bilateral bond holdings, as is shown in column (6). For the former,
a possible interpretation is that part of the portfolio adjustment has been to reallocate away from
contiguous countries towards fellow members of the euro area.
Overall, the results in Table 1 strongly indicate that the extent of bilateral financial integration
is stronger between EMU member countries than between other country pairs. To the extent that
the process of portfolio adjustment began before 1997 and was not completed by the 2001, our
estimates may actually understate the impact of EMU on bond allocations. Of course, this finding
requires more extensive testing by exploring other specifications and econometric techniques, but
these initial steps establish a benchmark for such future empirical investigations.24
4.2 What Drives Variation in the External Bond Portfolios of Individual Member
Countries?
In this subsection, we explore heterogeneity across euro-area members in terms of their external
bond holdings: the exposure of member countries to external country risk is asymmetric to the
extent that such heterogeneities are important. As in Table 1, we again employ the ‘double fixed
eﬀects’ specification
log(BONDij) = φi + φj + γ log(IMPij) + βZij + εij i{EMU} (3)
where the set of source countries is restricted to members of the euro area and the set of destination
countries now includes only destinations outside the euro area.25 The results are reported in columns
24As one robustness check, we entered distance in a non-linear (quadratic) format. This was done in view of the
close geographic proximity of EMU member countries (relative to other country pairs). In general, the results are
very similar for the EURO dummy. See Lane (2005).
25We exclude Luxembourg as a source country, in view of its predominant role as an oﬀshore center. The external
investment pattern for Luxembourg-associated holdings is reasonably similar to the euro area average, with the
exception that a lower weight is attached to the UK and a higher weight to ‘other Europe.’ The results are also
essentially unchanged if Ireland (the other main euro area oﬀshore center) is excluded.
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(1)-(3) of Table 3.
We begin in column (1) by including just imports as a bilateral regressor. This variable is
highly significant: the greater is the import dependence of a member country on a given external
destination, bond holdings in that country are 67 percent higher.26 We expand the specification
to include some gravity-type variables, plus the correlation in growth rates and the tax treaty
dummy in column (2). Finally, again at the cost of a major reduction in sample size, we include
a dummy variable for ‘common legal origin’ in column (3). The imports variable remains highly
significant in these broader specifications and its magnitude slightly increases to [80,88] percent. It
is important to emphasize that the import variable is largely unaﬀected by the inclusion of these
gravity variables, despite their importance in explaining bilateral trade patterns. This suggests
that the volume of trade per se is important in determining bond investment patterns, as opposed
to imports merely proxying for these other informational variables.
Among the other explanatory variables, the tax treaty dummy is significantly positive in both
columns (2) and (3) - again, this is best interpreted as an indicator of institutional similarity. That
the correlation in growth rates enters in a significantly positive manner is on the surface puzzling -
a diversification motive should point to reducing allocations to those countries that share a business
cycle with the home country.27 Distance is not significant: since the euro area countries are close
to one another, diﬀerences in the distances to particular external partners are relatively small,
such that this variable may not have much marginal explanatory power. Finally, the colonial and
common language dummies are significant in columns (2) but not in column (3): as before, this may
be explained by the greater importance of these variables in explaining allocations to developing
country destinations that are featured more heavily in the sample in column (2) than in column
(3).28
26 If the fixed eﬀects are excluded, the estimated import coeﬃcient is 0.56 t = 26.74) and the adj R2 = 0.39.
27As noted earlier, we have inadequate data on bond returns to study in more detail the relation between the
comovements in bond returns and allocations. In related work, Couerdacier and Guibaud (2005) argue that the
apparent positive association between the bilateral comovements in equity returns and bilateral equity holdings can
be explained by reverse causation: an increase in bilateral portfolio holdings in equilibrium raises the correlation in
equity returns.
28The colonial dummy actually enters with a negative sign. Its loss of significance in column (3) may also be related
to the inclusion of the common legal origin dummy that is highly correlated with the colonial dummy.
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4.3 External Bond Investment in EMUMember Countries: Sources of Heterogeneity
In columns (4)-(6) of Table 3, we examine which bilateral factors are important in determining
asymmetries in the distribution of inward investment across the individual member countries of the
euro area. For this purpose, we again use a “double fixed eﬀects” specification
log(BONDij) = φi + φj + γ log(IMPij) + βZij + εij j{EMU} (4)
Here, the set of source countries is restricted to non-members of EMU and the destinations are the
set of member countries.29
As before, we start in column (4) by just including imports as a regressor. This is significantly
positive - the distribution of inward bond investment across the member countries is positively
related to variation in the strength of the trading links with external investing nations. Similar
to columns (2)-(3), we expand the specifications in columns (5)-(6) to include a larger number of
regressors, with an attendant reduction in sample size.
In these expanded regressions, few variables are individually significant - while there is high
overall explanatory power, the correlations among the regressors mean that individual significance
is lost. (One way to think about this is that there is little variation in bilateral imports in these
samples, once the gravity-type variables are entered into the specification.) As in columns (2)-
(3), the correlation in growth rates is significantly positive in column (5). The common language
dummy in significant in column (6) - taken together with the result in column (3), this indicates
that a common language is more important for explaining inward investment into the euro area
than outward investment.
5 Conclusions
This paper has exploited the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey to build a profile
of the euro area as both a source and destination for international bond investment. We have
documented the importance of the aggregate euro area in global bond markets but highlighted that
the are substantial asymmetries in the external patterns of outward and inward investment with
respect to the individual member countries.
29We exclude Luxembourg as a destination country.
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Our results are strongly indicative that EMU has had a substantial impact on global bond
portfolios. In both levels and diﬀerences, cross-investment among euro area members is subsantially
greater than among other country pairs, even controlling for other characteristics that may generate
strong investment linkages across the euro area. As a caveat, the biggest source of uncertainty about
our results is that the 2001 data are perhaps too premature to establish the full impact of EMU
on international bond portfolios, to the extent that holdings are adjusted only gradually over time.
To settle this question will require a longer span of data to become available, such that these
specifications should be re-estimated as new releases of the CPIS become available.
In terms of understanding the sources of the “euro” bias, more research is required. In contrast
to the literature that investigates the impact of EMU on trade in goods, there are two factors
at work in terms of its impact on bond trade that are not easily separated - EMU both reduces
bilateral trading costs and, by fundamentally altering the risk and payoﬀ profiles of the bonds
issued by the individual member countries, also changes the elasticity of substitution between these
bonds.30
A second message from our empirical work is that there are asymmetries across member
countries in terms of the bilateral composition of their bond assets and liabilities. Another extension
of this line of research is to push the analysis further by examining the extent to which the observed
asymmetries in portfolios across euro area members and between the euro area and the rest of
the world materially contributes to asymmetries in wealth dynamics across these countries and
regions. In this regard, the Argentina default provided an interesting localised example (Italian
retail investors were among the main European financial casualty in that episode.) However, in the
event of a more widespread crisis in international financial markets, such asymmetries may pose
a more serious problem at both the European and global levels in terms of the optimal design of
policy responses.
Finally, another direction for future research is to understand the implications for EMU for asset
pricing and the degree of financial development. A unified market for euro-denominated securities
30See Lane (2006) for an overview of the impact of EMU on goods trade. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
provide a general survey of the impact of shifts in trading costs on the volume of goods trade - this relation turns on
the elasticity of substitution between home and foriegn goods (which is typically assumed to be a fixed parameter).
Martin and Rey (2004) study the impact of a reduction in cross-border trading costs on asset trade - but again take
the elasticity of substitution between assets to be fixed.
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with lower transactions costs raises the value of these assets, reducing required yields and the
cost of capital.31 In addition, increased cross-holdings increases the correlation in returns across
countries, altering the international transmission mechanism for financial shocks. Accordingly,
the macroeconomic and financial impact of greater financial integration within the euro area (and
between the euro area and the rest of the world) presents an exciting research agenda for economists.
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Figure 1: International Bond Holdings. Ratios to GDP. Source: Author’s calculations, based on
CPIS data.
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Table 1: Is there a Euro Bias?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level Level Level Diﬀ. Diﬀ. Diﬀ.
Euro Dummy 1.46 0.76 0.69 0.83 0.62 0.81
(8.2)*** (3.58)*** (3.21)*** (4.58)*** (2.42)** (3.12)***
Log(Imports) 0.22 0.21 0.06 0.06
(3.44)*** (2.6)*** (1.62) (1.94)*
VOL(ER) -0.14 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03
(1.56) (1.75)* (.56) (.38)
EU Dummy 0.14 0.28 -0.1 0.07
(.62) (1.16) (.37) (.26)
Border -0.33 -0.45 -0.36 -0.33
(1.52) (2.25)** (1.68)* (1.63)
Log(Distance) -0.55 -0.50 -0.01 0.09
(4.33)*** (3.73)*** (.1) (.99)
Colony 0.38 0.36 -0.09 -0.2
(1.7)* (1.56) (.34) (.86)
Common Language 0.30 0.02 0.25 0.06
(1.93)* (.13) (1.34) (.29)
Correl(Growth Rates) -0.23 -0.33 0.04 -0.2
(1.12) (1.4) (.16) (.86)
Tax Treaty -0.02 0.26 0.29 0.33
(.1) (1.46) (1.42) (1.43)
Common Legal Origin 0.47 0.2
(4.28)*** (1.75)*
Number of observations 1132 1025 712 765 705 534
Number of sources 22 22 21 19 19 18
Number of destinations 114 95 48 96 89 48
Adj R2 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.29 0.3 0.35
Marginal R2 0.05 0.21 0.33 0.02 0.06 0.10
Estimation is by pooled least squares, with “double fixed eﬀects.” Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ refer to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively.
Marginal R2 is the explanatory power of the bilateral variables in explaining the residuals from an
‘only fixed eﬀects’ regression. See Appendix B for the definitions and data sources for the variables.
19
Table 2: Changes in Holdings for EMU Member Countries 1997 to 2001
World Euro Area
Austria 103.7 170.6
Belgium 90.5 138.7
France 124.4 192.7
Germany
Italy 78.6 349.4
Luxembourg
Netherlands 112.0 106.4
Finland 344.6 1064.0
Greece
Ireland 216.8 219.4
Portugal 124.6 196.8
Spain 317.4 914.7
Percentage growth in each country’s international bond holdings: aggregate and in other euro area
countries.
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Table 3: Heterogeneity in the External Bond Portfolios of EMU Member Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Out Out Out In In In
Log(Imports) 0.51 0.59 0.63 0.29 0.18 0.22
(10.8)*** (10.4)*** (6.93)*** (2.9)*** (1.56) (1.44)
Log(Distance) 0.05 -0.04 -0.41 -0.03
(.57) (.35) (1.64) (.11)
Colony -1.36 -0.72 0.22 0.65
(2.72)*** (1.16) (.33) (.82)
Common Language 1.02 0.68 0.33 0.82
(2.67)*** (1.57) (.94) (1.85)*
Correl(Growth Rates) 0.59 0.98 0.79 0.43
(1.73)* (2.08)** (1.94)* (.83)
Tax Treaty 0.71 1.02 0.1 -0.23
(3.18)*** (3.4)*** (.37) (.72)
Common Legal Origin -0.14 -0.27
(.56) (1.1)
Number of observations 501 458 275 335 313 244
Number of sources 11 11 11 47 45 36
Number of destinations 92 81 35 11 11 11
Adj R2 0.24 0.37 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.85
Marginal R2 0.15 0.29 0.10 0.81 0.83 0.84
Estimation is by pooled least squares, with “double fixed eﬀects.” Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ refer to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively.
Marginal R2 is the explanatory power of the bilateral variables in explaining the residuals from an
‘only fixed eﬀects’ regression. See Appendix B for the definitions and data sources for the variables.
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Appendix
A Countries and regions participating in the 2001 Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey
Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR of China, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR of China, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Netherlands
Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.
B Data Sources
This paper largely draws upon the databank constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004).
Long-term debt securities: issued by host country residents and held by source country residents.
Source: 2001 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Total international bond issues. Source: BIS.
Source-country imports: Imports of goods by source countries from host countries (average 1997-
2001). Source, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. For external
source countries, imports from the euro area is the sum of imports from the individual member
countries.
Distance: logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host
country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Correlation in growth rates: correlation between the GDP growth rate in the source and host
country. Source: authors’ calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host countries have a
legal system with a common origin (common law, French, German, or Scandinavian). Source:
authors’ elaborations based on La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
Exchange Rate Volatility. Exchange rate data are from IFS. Measured as standard deviation of
monthly log diﬀerence in the bilateral nominal exchange rate over 1998-2001.
Tax treaty: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the source and host country have a tax
treaty enacted prior to 1999. Source: authors’ elaborations based on treaty data taken from
www.unctad.org.
Common Language: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country share a common
language. For aggregate euro area, this takes value 1 if the partner shares a common language
with any EMU member country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Colony dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial
relationship. For aggregate euro area, this takes value 1 if the partner shares a colonial
history with any EMU member country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Europe dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if the country is a member of ‘broad Europe’,
defined by inclusion in the European football championship.
Euro dummy: takes the value 1 if both source and host countries are members of the euro area.
EU dummy: takes the value 1 if both source and host countries are members of the European
Union.
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